What does "similarly situated" mean anyway?

When we talk with employers, we tell them again and again that one of the best defenses to discrimination claims is to treat similarly situated employees the same.  But what does that mean?  When are employees similarly situated?  A recent discrimination case provides a good illustration of the concept.

In Hodczak v. Latrobe Specialty Steel Co., four employees in their late 50s and early 60s sued their employer for age discrimination after their employment was terminated.  According to the employer, it terminated the employees’ employment because they regularly exchanged emails containing sexually explicit photographs – i.e., porn – in violation of the company’s Electronic Communications Policy.  The employer discovered the porn exchange while it was investigating a sexual harassment complaint against one of the terminated employees.

The employees argued that their ages must have been the reason for their termination because other, younger employees had not been terminated despite similar behavior.  The court, however, rejected that argument.  As to one of the allegedly similarly situated younger employees, the court found that although he accessed pornographic websites on his work computer, he was not a supervisor and did not send the porn to anyone else.  As to another, the court found that he was not similarly situated to the older employees because there was no evidence that he actually sent any sexually explicit emails.  And, as to the third allegedly similarly situated individual, the court found that he sent only one email and did so from his personal computer.  In contrast, the older employees traded sexually explicit emails on a nearly daily basis from their work computers.

Based on this decision and others that have interpreted the concept of similarly situated employees, the following factors can often provide a legitimate basis for treating employees differently:

  • Supervisory employees versus non-supervisory employees
  • Employees subject to just-cause provisions in a collective bargaining agreement versus at-will employees
  • Employees who engage in a single instance of misconduct versus employees who are repeat offenders
  • Employees who hold positions that require interaction with the public versus employees who do not interact with the public
  • Employees who express regret and contrition versus employees who lie or blame others
  • Employees who use company property to perpetrate a wrong versus those who use their own property to do so

Determining whether employees are similarly situated for legal purposes is highly fact and context dependent.  If you have questions or are unsure, consult your legal counsel for advice.

There's still time to register for McDonald Hopkins' Labor and Employment Law Seminar

On November 3, 2011, McDonald Hopkins’ labor and employment law attorneys will present their annual seminar, Life Cycle of the Employment Relationship:  The Lay of the Land and How to Navigate It.  This all-day seminar will focus on hiring the right talent, protecting your company’s assets through the use of employment agreements, addressing data security issues, managing the employment relationship, and effectively parting ways with employees who are no longer a good fit.  A cocktail reception will follow.

Although McDonald Hopkins is pleased to offer this seminar free of charge to our clients and friends, space is limited.  To register, click here.  We hope to see you there!

NLRB GC outlines federal protections for employee social media activity

Report addresses what employers can and can’t do when an employee goes all @normarae


By George AsimouVictor Geraci and Todd Sarver

The Office of General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) issued a sprawling Report of the General Counsel (“Report”) on the interaction of employee social media activity and the National Labor Relations Act yesterday.   The Report summarizes the Office of General Counsel’s findings in a wide array of cases submitted for its review and provides some useful guidance for employers grappling with employee social media activity.  As a reminder, the NLRB has jurisdiction over union and non-union workplaces.

A recent survey by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce found that the NLRB has reviewed more than 129 cases involving social media in some way.   In April, the Office of General Counsel, in a commendable attempt to ensure consistent enforcement, directed the NLRB’s various regional offices across the country to submit social media cases to the NLRB’s Division of Advice.  In essence, the Office of General Counsel was taking a step back and looking over the whole field of cases in the interest of articulating some general principles as to the NLRB’s enforcement position on social media.  While the Office of General Counsel’s Report does not represent a binding ruling by the NLRB, the way unfair labor practice charges involving social media will be handled at the regional level is now much clearer.

McDonald Hopkins will be providing a comprehensive review of NLRB’s social media enforcement position, but we wanted to immediately provide clients with an initial take on the Office of General Counsel’s Report:

  • Employers are well advised to review their social media policy to ensure that it is narrowly tailored.   (Yes, we know you just implemented your policy.)

The Report frequently notes provisions of employer social media policies that the Office of General Counsel concluded could be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting protected activity under Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (which, amongst other things, provides employees with the right to engage in “concerted activities for the purpose of … mutual aid or protection”) and, therefore, were overly broad and unlawful.

Example: An employer policy that “prohibited employees from making disparaging remarks when discussing the company or supervisors, and from depicting the company in any media, including but not limited to the internet, without company permission” was deemed overly broad.  In the first instance, “disparaging remarks” about the company or supervisors may include concerted activity for the purposes of mutual aid or protection.  More subtly, barring media depictions of the company could be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting the posting of “a picture of employees carrying a picket sign depicting the company’s name” or the wearing of “a t-shirt portraying the company’s logo in connection with a protest involving terms and conditions of employment.”

Another Example:   An employer policy that, in part, “prohibited employees from using any social media that may violate, compromise, or disregard the rights and reasonable expectations of privacy or confidentiality of any person or entity” was deemed overly broad.  The Office of General Counsel noted that the rule provided no definition or guidance as to what the employer [here, a hospital] considered to be private or confidential.  Accordingly, the rule “could be reasonably interpreted as prohibiting protected employee discussion of wages or other terms and conditions of employment.”

Yet Another Example:   A newspaper’s management repeatedly tells a reporter that the tweets on his Twitter account, which identifies him as a reporter for the paper and links to the newspaper’s website, should exclusively address news items pertinent to his beat after he blasts the paper’s copy desk in a tweet, picks a fight with a local television station in a tweet, and tweets about recent crimes, some of which were sexual in nature.   Here, the Office of General Counsel concluded that newspaper management’s oral instructions to the reporter did not constitute formal work “rules,” but rather direction in the context of individual discipline over specific misconduct and therefore were not overly broad – but suggested that similar orally promulgated rules implemented more broadly would be violative of Section 7.

The Office of General Counsel’s fine-tooth comb analysis dictates, at minimum, prominent disclaimer language that the employer’s social media policy does not prohibit the exercise of Section 7 rights.  Even employers who have recently implemented social media policies should consider a quick review of the policy by legal counsel in light of the General Counsel’s recent Report.

  • Employers may reasonably get mad about an employee’s online antics, but should talk to counsel before getting even.

A substantial portion of the Report is devoted to making distinctions between mutual aid and protection as to terms and conditions of employment (protected) and individual griping about the job (not protected).  Given the NLRB’s legislative mandate to promote and protect employee rights, the Office of General Counsel not surprisingly takes an expansive view of what constitutes protected activity.

Example:   A “luxury” automobile dealership puts on a sales event that includes complimentary food and beverages.  Some of the dealership’s sales professionals believe the assortment of “small bags of chips, inexpensive cookies from the warehouse club, semi-fresh fruit, and a hot dog cart where clients could get overcooked hot dogs and stale buns” are, ahem, déclassé.   One of the sales professionals posts his thoughts on the sales event on Facebook, including photos of the allegedly lackluster spread, other sales professionals posing by the offending snack table, and one of the dealership’s promotional banners.  As the Office of General Counsel subtly notes, “the employee included comments along with the photographs, reflecting his critical opinion of the inexpensive food and beverages provided.”  The sales professional was ultimately terminated.  The Office of General Counsel concluded that the Facebook posts were protected concerted activity as they reflected the consensus of a number of the dealership’s sales professionals and employee discontent as to promotional efforts was directly relevant to the terms and conditions of employment because the sales professionals were commissioned employees. The Office of General Counsel also noted that, while some employee conduct can be so outrageous as not to be protected, the Facebook post in question was “much less offensive than other behavior found protected by the Board” and “did not refer to the quality of the cars or the performance of the dealership and did not criticize the employer’s management.”

Another example:  A number of former and present employees of a sports bar are informed by their state that they owe taxes on certain income earned at the bar.  The tax assessment upsets the employees and the issue is placed on the agenda for an upcoming meeting.  A former employee subsequently posts about her discontent on Facebook (including, as the Office General Counsel notes, “a shorthand expletive”) and asserts that the employer “could not even do paperwork correctly.”  A current employee clicks that he “likes” the post.  A second current employee responded to the post, calling one of the bar’s owners a term not acceptable under the standards of Midwestern nice.   Both current employees are terminated.  The employee that “liked” the original Facebook post was “told he would be hearing from the employer’s attorney.”   The employee that actually added additional commentary received a letter from employer’s counsel informing her that the employer intended on filing suit for defamation if she did not delete the post.  The Office of General Counsel concluded that both employees had engaged in protected concerted activity in expressing “truly group complaints,” noting further that even an allegedly defamatory statement will not lose its protected status unless it is not only false, but maliciously false.  More instructively, the Office of General Counsel concluded that the threat of lawsuit, even if there was a reasonable basis for legal action, violated Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act as it interfered with the right to mutual aid and protection.

Overall, the take away is that, despite the Office of General Counsel’s best efforts, general principles of what is protected and what is not protected will necessarily give way to the specific facts of a given case – and a lot of judgment calls.  Employers are advised to consult with legal counsel in determining the best response to even the most egregious employee conduct in the social media realm.

As noted above, the Report of General Counsel is sweeping in its scope and addresses other finer points of law such as the legal bounds of union use of social media, policies governing co-workers “pressuring” other co-workers to use social media, and policies governing employee contact with the media.

McDonald Hopkins will continue to provide further guidance in the near term, including a long-form alert that deals with the Report and other related legal developments comprehensively.  In the interim, if you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact one of us.

Fight for your right: Employer successfully challenges EEOC administrative subpoena

Administrative agencies, the EEOC and NLRB included, often view their subpoena powers broadly – sometimes in the estimation of employers and their counsel, too broadly. A recent Pennsylvania federal court case took a narrower view.

In EEOC v University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC).pdf, the district court for the Western District of Pennsylvania ruled that an administrative subpoena the EEOC issued the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center was a “fishing expedition” and denied the application for enforcement of the subpoena.

The dispute stemmed from an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) charge filed against a nursing home employer, Heritage Green, regarding an employee it discharged after the employee exhausted available leave. Heritage Green is a subsidiary of UPMC.

The EEOC sent UPMC a request for information seeking the identity of all employees corporate-wide who had been terminated pursuant to leave of absence or disability policies. When UPMC refused, the EEOC issued a subpoena for the information. UPMC filed a motion to revoke or modify the subpoena.

The court stated that, while the EEOC has broad subpoena power, that power is not without limits. The court concluded that the EEOC’s subpoena “overreached” and that the information sought could not be deemed relevant to the charge.

The court also somewhat chastised the EEOC for not doing anything to otherwise investigate the charge, or to more narrowly tailor the information sought. The EEOC had not made any effort to determine whether an individual violation occurred before launching an investigation into an alleged systematic violation.

Most state and federal agencies have been increasingly aggressive in recent years regarding their use of subpoena power. While employers should proactively engage administrative agencies to avoid potentially costly subpoena disputes, employers also should carefully review information sought, both informally and through subpoenas, to ensure they are not needlessly opening their operations to unnecessary scrutiny.

NLRB posts two complaints in May regarding employee activity on Facebook

As we reported last November in our Alert on Social Media and Protected Concerted Activity, the NLRB issued a complaint against American Medical Response of Connecticut for firing one of its employees based on unsavory comments the employee made about her supervisor. The case ultimately settled, so the connection between an employee’s Facebook activity and protected activity was not developed.

The NLRB, however, seems intent on developing this particular area of protected activity. This month, the NLRB has filed two complaints against employers for terminating employees due to alleged protected activity on Facebook.

On May 18, the NLRB announced that it had filed a complaint against a non-union, not-for-profit employer in Buffalo, New York for firing five employees based on comments posted on Facebook. According to the NLRB, an employee posted a statement that her fellow workers were not doing enough to help the organization. Her post generated responses from co-workers defending their work habits and complaining about staffing levels and work load. After the employer learned of the posts, it discharged five employees who responded to the initial post based on harassment. The NLRB contends, however, that the discharged employees were engaged in protected concerted activity. The hearing currently is scheduled for June 22, 2011.

On May 24, the NLRB announced that it had filed a complaint against a Chicago area BMW car dealer for allegedly violating employee rights by terminating an employee for posting photos and critical comments about the dealership. During a promotion of a new BMW model, the employees complained about the quality of food and beverages being used in connection with the promotion, and expressed concern that the poor quality of the event would adversely affect their sales commissions. One employee proceeded to post his complaints on Facebook. The dealership requested that the employee remove the posts, which he did; but then subsequently terminated his employment. The NLRB’s complaint alleges that the terminated employee engaged in protected concerted activity and therefore, could not be terminated for his actions. The hearing currently is set for July 21, 2011.

Both union and non-union employees are permitted to engage in protected concerted activity. It is unlawful for an employer to discipline or discharge an employee for engaging in such activity. While depending upon what is said, concerted activity can lose its protection, that inquiry is very much a case-by-case analysis. Stay tuned to see how successful the NLRB is in establishing its portrayal of Facebook as the new “water cooler.”